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Investment advisers ("advisers") registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") now manage more than $70 trillion in assets
for more than 35 million clients.' Growing numbers of foreign-domiciled
advisers are seeking access to this expansive market. Over the last two years,
the number of foreign asset managers registering with the SEC has grown by
an annual rate of 7.7-8.5%.2 This trend is not new. As early as the 1980s,
foreign-domiciled advisers began to seek access to the market for U.S.
advisory services.3 These advisers pose a difficult regulatory problem.
Pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act" or "Act")
the SEC regulates advisers.4 However, when foreign-domiciled advisers
register with the SEC, they straddle the international border. While the SEC
* John H. Walsh is a partner with Eversheds Sutherland (US) LLP. He has a J.D. from
Georgetown University and a Ph.D. in History from Boston College. He has published
widely on securities regulation and compliance.
1. Evolution Revolution: A Profile of the Investment Adviser Profession, INV.
ADVISER Ass'N 2, 5 (2017), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/INVEST
MENTADVISER/aaO3843e-7981-46b2-aa49-
c572f2ddb7e8/Uploadedlmages/publications/EvolutionRevolution_2017.pdf.
2. Id. at 34.
3. See infra Section II.
4. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 et seq. (2018).
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regulates them, they can also have significant foreign operations and client
relationships. How should the SEC account for these advisers' foreign
activities in its regulation and oversight? This Article studies the policy-
making process in which the SEC set out to answer that question.
As described more fully below, the fundamental regulatory policy that
eventually emerged in this area was set out in an informal staff position
issued in 1992 known as the Unibanco letter.' Over the years the Unibanco
letter and its progeny6 have drawn considerable attention from
commentators, regulators, and practitioners. During the 1990s, a key period
in this process, commentators recognized that the regulation of foreign-
domiciled advisers played a role in the SEC's adaption to the global market.7
More recently, the foreign reach of the Advisers Act has again drawn
commentary as both the Supreme Court and Congress have addressed
relevant legal doctrines.' Further, based on the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010,9
the SEC engaged in rulemaking that cited to and relied upon the Unibanco
letter's policy.'o In March 2017 the SEC staff issued an information update
for advisers relying on the Unibanco letters with suggestions on how they
could document their compliance." Finally, practitioners' guides have
offered hands-on practical advice to advisers, both upon the initial issuance
of the Unibanco letter,12 and upon new developments. 3
This Article takes a different approach. It focuses on the policy vision that
inspired the Unibanco letter, and continues to be reflected in its progeny. The
5. Uniao de Bancos de Brasileiros S.A., SEC No-Action Letter, Ref. No. 92-273-
CC, File No. 132-3 (July 28, 1992) [hereinafter Unibanco letter], https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/investment/noaction/1 992/uniaodebancos072892.pdf.
6. For a discussion of the Unibanco letter's progeny, see infra Section IV.
7. See, e.g., Bevis Longstreth, A Look at The SEC's Adaption to Global Market
Pressures, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 319, 327-28 (1995).
8. See, e.g., Arthur Laby, Regulation of Global Financial Firms After Morrison v.
Australia National Bank, 87 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 561, 588-90 (2013) (discussing the
impact of the United States Supreme Court's 2010 decision in Morrison v. Australia
National Bank and Congress's response by way of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010).
9. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
10. See infra Section IV.
11. Information Update for Advisers Relying on the Unibanco No-Action Letters,
SEC DIVISION INV. MGMT. (Mar. 2017) [hereinafter Update for Advisers],
https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-info-2017-03.pdf
12. See, e.g., Robert Mollen & Rachel Arfa, Investment Advisers Caught in SEC Net,
11 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 25 (1992) (discussing the practical requirements of the SEC staff's
initial position).
13. See, e.g., Gary Grandik et al., Unibanco After Dodd-Frank: The Extraterritorial
Reach of the Investment Advisers Act, 20 INV. LAW. 1 (2013) (discussing the practical
impact of the Dodd-Frank Act in this area).
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Unibanco letter, this Article suggests, was motivated by a multi-faceted
policy vision that appeared unevenly in the public record. Some of its
elements were made explicit, some appeared only as tantalizing hints that
require further explanation to be understood, and some were practically
invisible. To explore the SEC's development of this policy vision this
Article relies on interviews with the leading SEC participants. 14 With
interviews it has been possible to more fully identify the pressures working
on the agency and the vision that inspired its response. Beyond the worthy
goal of adding to our understanding of this important area of international
regulation, understanding the policy vision inspiring the Unibanco letter will
enhance our ability to interpret and apply it, and its progeny, as developments
in the wider world continue to unfold.
After this Introduction, Part I of this Article summarizes the Act, the
SEC's regulatory regime for advisers, and how the agency established an
early border regime that was consistent with the primary contemporary mode
of communication, i.e., the mails. Part II discusses the challenges to this
regime that arose in the 1980s, in the wake of new technologies and
internationalization, the efforts of the SEC staff to respond through an
informal staff position known as the Richard Ellis letter, 5 and the pressures
that built against that position through the need for foreign enforcement
cooperation, the threat of foreign multi-lateral intervention during the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, and business pressures from foreign
advisers that wished to enter the U.S. market. Part III discusses the critical
moment in this narrative, when the SEC staff reconsidered its policy and
issued the Unibanco letter. Part IV discusses the continuing relevance of the
policy vision of the Unibanco letter, up to and including the new regulatory
information issued in March 2017. The Article concludes that the Unibanco
letter and its progeny should be understood and applied in light of the policy
vision that inspired the agency action.
I. REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND THE EARLY REGULATORY
BORDER
The Advisers Act applies to persons who, for compensation, engage in the
business of advising others, either directly or through publications and
writings, as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling
14. Notes of interviews cited in this history are on file with the author. The author
wishes to express his gratitude to the officials who agreed to be interviewed.
Nonetheless, the author alone is responsible for all statements and conclusions herein.
15. Richard Ellis, SEC No-Action Letter, Ref. No. 80-401-CC, File No. 132-3, (Aug.
8, 1981) [hereinafter Ellis Letter], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/
198 1/richardellis031981 .pdf.
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securities.1 6 The essential purpose of the legislation was to protect the public
from "the frauds and misrepresentations of unscrupulous tipsters and touts
and to safeguard the honest investment adviser from the stigma" of those
activities. 7 The SEC was given statutory responsibility for administering
this regime.'
The SEC is an independent regulatory commission, composed of five
Commissioners appointed by the President with the advice and consent of
the Senate.' 9 A Chairman named by the President from among the
Commissioners leads the agency.20 The Commissioners are supported by a
professional staff, which has remained relatively small, numbering
somewhat less than 3,000 employees in the early 1990s,2 1 and approximately
4,600 today.22 Division Directors are the most senior members of the staff,
and Associate Directors report to Directors.23
As an independent regulatory commission, the SEC performs all three of
the federal government's functions. The SEC has a legislative function, in
the sense that it adopts rules that have the force of law.24 Specialized
divisions administer this work, such as the Division of Investment
Management, which administers the statute and rules governing investment
advisers. 25 The SEC has an executive function, in the sense that it enforces
16. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(1 1) (2018).
17. H.R. REP.No. 76-2639, at 28 (1940).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(4) (defining "Commission" as the SEC); id. passim
(assigning authorities and responsibilities to the "Commission").
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2018).
20. Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950, 15 Fed. Reg. 3175 (May 24, 1950),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 901 (2006), and in 64 Stat. 1265 (1950).
21. 1993 Annual Report, SEC 150 (1993), https://www.sec.gov/about/annual
report/1993.pdf
22. Chairman Jay Clayton, Fiscal Year 2017 Agency Financial Report, SEC (Nov.
14. 2017), https://www. sec.gov/reports -and-publications/annual-reports/sec-20 17-agen
cy-financial-report.
23. In the 1990s, both ranks required admission into the United States Senior
Executive Service. Members of the Senior Executive Service ("SES") "serve in the key
positions just below the top Presidential appointees." Senior Executive Service, Leading
America's Workforce, OFF. PROF. MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversig
ht/senior-executive-service (last visited Apr. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Senior Executive
Service]. Following legislation in 2002 intended to achieve pay parity between the SEC
staff and other financial regulators, the SEC withdrew from the SES and now designates
SES-level staff as Senior Officers. See Investor and Capital Market Fee Relief Act, Pub.
L. 107-123, 115 Stat. 2390 (2002) (often called the "Pay Parity Act").
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (2018). Additional rulemaking authority is scattered
throughout the statutes administered by the SEC.
25. See Seventh Annual Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC 3
(1941), https://www.sec.gov/about/annualreport/1941.pdf
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the securities laws and its own rules.2 6 The Division of Enforcement
administers this work.2 7 Finally, the agency has a judicial function, in the
sense that it interprets the securities laws and its own rules. At the SEC, the
Chief Counsels, or senior lawyers of the specialized divisions, administer
this work.28 The Chief Counsels' interpretations often take a form known as
"no-action" letters - so called because the staff indicates it will not
recommend enforcement action to the Commission if its interpretative
guidance is followed.29
Through these means-rules, enforcement actions, and interpretations-
the SEC has created a regulatory regime for investment advisers. Perhaps
most importantly, under U.S. law, advisers are fiduciaries.30 This requires
them to adhere to a rigorous standard of professional conduct, known as the
fiduciary duty.3 ' In addition, advisers are required to register with the SEC.32
They are required to provide disclosure information to clients and potential
clients.33 They are prohibited from charging performance fees-that is,
sharing in their clients' profits-unless certain conditions are met.34
Moreover, the SEC tests advisers' compliance through regulatory
examinations 35 and brings enforcement actions against advisers when
violations are found.36
Where then is the international border for this regulatory regime? When
Congress enacted the Advisers Act, it defined the conduct that brought one
within its scope. The Act applies to investment advisers who "make use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce" in
26. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u.
27. See, e.g., 1993 Annual Report, supra note 21, at 1-17.
28. When a Chief Counsel is given the title "Associate Director-Chief Counsel," he
or she has been admitted to the Senior Executive Service, or after 2002, made a Senior
Officer of the SEC. See Senior Executive Service, supra note 23.
29. Informal & Other Procedures, 17 C.F.R. § 202.1(d) (2018).
30. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 291 (1963)
(demonstrating an instance whereby the Supreme Court upheld advisers' fiduciary status
following an enforcement action brought by the SEC).
31. See, e.g., Information for Newly-Registered Investment Advisers, SEC DIVISION
INV. MGMT. AND COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS (Nov. 23, 2010),
www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/advoverview.htm (stating that as fiduciaries advisers
"have a fundamental obligation to act in the best interest of [their] clients and to provide
investment advice in [their] clients' best interests"). They also owe their clients a duty
of undivided loyalty and utmost good faith. Id.
32. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(a) (2018).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-3(a).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5.
35. Id. § 80b-4(a).
36. Id. § 80b-9(d).
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connection with their business as investment advisers.37 As a matter of U.S.
Constitutional Law, this provision identifies the "means" by which the
federal government is exercising jurisdiction, here by means of the
Commerce Clause. 38 Further, this provision is given additional reach by
another section of the Act, section 208(d), which makes it unlawful "for any
person indirectly, or through or by any other person, to do any act or thing
which it would be unlawful for such person to do directly under the
provisions" of the Act or any rule thereunder.39 in other words, if an adviser
(as defined by the Act) uses the U.S. mail or another means of U.S. interstate
commerce, either directly or indirectly, in connection with its advisory
business, it is subject to the regulatory regime. 4 0 At first glance, this seems
to be a straightforward and sufficient answer to the jurisdictional question.
Indeed, when the law was enacted in 1940, it probably was. At the time,
U.S. investment advisers appear to have been small businesses that were
located and operating solely within the U.S. As one Representative said on
the floor of the House during debate on the Act, the legislation would apply
to "hundreds of small partnerships and thousands of individuals." 4 1
Nonetheless, at a relatively early date in the regulatory regime, the SEC
became concerned about its ability to oversee advisers whose principal
offices were located outside of the U.S. As early as the 1950s, the SEC
worried that it would be unable to take enforcement action if a foreign-
domiciled adviser engaged in violations.42  To give itself the same
opportunity to enforce rights and duties that it had in regards to domestic
advisers, as part of the registration process, the SEC required non-domestic
advisers to provide written irrevocable consents and powers of attorney
naming the SEC as an agent for service of any process, pleadings or other
papers in regards to relevant civil suits or actions.4 3 This provision remains
in place today.44
In this environment, foreign advisers who sought to do business in the U.S.
without registration posed the primary foreign threat to the regulatory
regime. Given the technological state of communications in which the
37. See, e.g., id. § 80b-3(a).
38. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 3.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-8(d).
40. Exceptions to the statutory and regulatory positions set out in the text will be
mentioned only when pertinent to the relevant policy developments.
41. 86 CONG. REC. 9811, 9813-14 (1940) (statement of Rep. Hinshaw).
42. 21st Annual Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC 104
(1955),https://www.sec.gov/about/annualreport/1955.pdf
43. Id.
44. The modem signature requirements are contained in Form ADV, the adviser
registration form.
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Advisers Act had been enacted, one could expect this threat to manifest itself
through the use of the U.S. mails. In the late 1960s the SEC brought an
enforcement case that epitomized this era. C.V. Myers, a resident of
Calgary, Canada, published a newsletter called Myers' Finance Review. 4 5
He deposited multiple copies of his newsletter bearing U.S. addresses, as
well as solicitations to subscribe, into the Canadian mails. In the ordinary
course, the items were delivered to the U.S. addressees. When the SEC
accused him of operating as an unregistered U.S. adviser, Myers responded
that he had lawfully deposited the items at the Canadian Post Office
Building, and had not made use of the U.S. mails. A U.S. federal court
rejected his argument.4 6 The court found that Myers had engaged in the
business of investment advising in the U.S., because, while he had deposited
the envelopes in a Canadian post office, the addresses on the envelopes were
within the U.S..47 The court issued an injunction against him, despite Myer's
objection to its assertion of personal jurisdiction over him. 48 Of course, one
should note, Myers' threat to continue to "infiltrate from the north" by
sending thousands of letters into the U.S. without SEC registration did not
help his case.4 9
Once an adviser was registered in the U.S., the SEC staff took an
expansive view of its jurisdiction over the adviser's activities. A no-action
letter issued in 1973 is illustrative. A U.S. citizen informed the Chief
Counsel of the Division of Investment Management that he was considering
registering as an investment adviser, and asked whether he could handle
foreign clients and set up a subsidiary to deal with foreign clients without
complying with SEC regulations.5 0 The SEC staff responded that he must
comply with the U.S. regulatory regime in both regards. 5 ' As a registered
adviser, the SEC staff said, he could not violate SEC regulations in advice to
foreign clients, and his foreign subsidiary would be required to register and
be subject to the Act.52 Similarly, in a no-action letter issued in 1975, the
Chief Counsel took the view that an SEC-registered adviser must comply
with applicable U.S. standards for clients both "within and without of the
United States." 53 Eventually, the staff did recognize some slight flexibility,
45. SEC v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 745 (D. Md. 1968).
46. Id. at 745-46.
47. Id. at 747.
48. Id. at 747-48.
49. See id. at 747.
50. Hany Kamal, SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 11796 (May 2, 1973).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. S&R Management Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1975 WL 10884 (Jan. 31, 1975).
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such as allowing a foreign adviser serving only foreign clients to use the U.S.
jurisdictional means to obtain information about U.S. stock prices and to
instruct a U.S. broker-dealer to buy or sell such securities on behalf of the
foreign clients.54 However, the fundamental policy position remained: other
than these minimal contacts from abroad, once a foreign adviser had entered
the U.S. market and registered with the SEC, all of its advisory activities,
affiliates, and clients, both domestic and foreign, were subject to the U.S.
regulatory regime.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION IN THE 1980s
In the 1980s, new technology and enhanced communications began to
break down the barriers between previously isolated national financial
markets. As an SEC Commissioner put it, technological and
telecommunications developments that had "accumulated gradually below
the surface" suddenly began to have a substantial impact." Investment
advisers participated in these developments as U.S. investors developed an
appetite for foreign advice. Specifically, U.S. managed funds containing
foreign securities grew, and foreign investing became both practical and
popular.56 Foreign advisers were interested in meeting this demand and they
increasingly sought to enter the U.S. market, including by serving as sub-
advisers to U.S. advisers who were managing mutual funds.
In early 1981 the Office of Chief Counsel of the Division of Investment
Management issued the no-action letter that came to define this era. In
March of 1981, Richard Ellis, a partnership organized under the laws of the
United Kingdom, wrote to the staff requesting a no-action letter." Richard
Ellis had an indirect subsidiary in the United States-owned through an
intervening holding company-that wanted to register as an investment
adviser. The U.S. subsidiary wanted to advise both domestic and foreign
clients regarding investments in securities. As the subsidiary's corporate
parent, Richard Ellis wanted to know if it would also be required to register
as an investment adviser.
54. See, e.g., Forty Four Management, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30741 (Jan.
31, 1983).
55. Edward Fleischman, Comm'r, SEC, Address to the First General Plenary Session
of the U.S./Japan Bilateral Session: A New Era in Legal and Economic Relations (Aug.
29, 1988), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1988/082988fleischman.pdf
56. See David Ruder, Chairman, SEC, Address Before the 1988 Mutual Funds and
Investment Advisers Conference: A Changing Environment for Investment Companies,
Speech (Mar. 21, 1988) [hereinafter Ruder Address], https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
1988/032188ruder.pdf.
57. Id.
58. See Ellis Letter, supra note 15.
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In August 1981, the SEC staff replied by granting Richard Ellis the
requested no-action relief.5 9 The letter sets out the regulatory problem, as
well as the staff's solution. First, after noting the definition of an investment
adviser, the staff said: "an unregistered foreign company engaged in
investment advisory business which does not make use of jurisdictional
means in connection with its investment advisory business is not in
violation" of the Act's registration provision. 60  However, the staff
continued, the question remained whether Richard Ellis would be doing
indirectly, through its subsidiary, what it could not do directly without
registering, which could be in violation of section 208(d) of the Act. In short,
the question was: if an unregistered foreign company creates and owns a
subsidiary that uses the U.S. jurisdictional means in connection with an
advisory business, would that subject the foreign parent to the U.S.
regulatory regime?
This question presented itself to the staff as a matter of regulatory
interpretation: what is the meaning of indirect action pursuant to section
208(d) of the Act? 6 ' The effect, however, was to decide the location of the
U.S. regulatory border. In 1981, the staff decided that if a subsidiary
functioned independently and had an existence independent of the parent,
the mere fact of its creation and continued ownership by the parent would
not bring the parent within the scope of the prohibition on indirect action.62
In other words, if the subsidiary was truly independent, the regulatory border
would run between the U.S. registered adviser and its foreign parent.
In the no-action letter to Richard Ellis, the staff also set out a series of
steps the subsidiary should take to assure its independence. These steps were
similar to those set out in an earlier rule proposal. In 1972, the SEC proposed
a rule that would have established the factors to be considered when
determining whether the corporate parent of a registered investment adviser
must itself register with the SEC. 63 The rulemaking process only considered
domestic relationships, and the rule was never adopted, but the
Commission's explanation at the time for considering the rule is
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 8.
63. Notice of Proposals to (1) Adopt New Rule 202-1 Under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, as Amended ("Advisers Act"), with Respect to Exemption from the
Definition of "Investment Adviser", and (2) Amend Rule 204-2(A) Under the Advisers
Act by Amending Paragraph (12) and Adopting New Paragraphs (13) and (14)
Thereunder with Respect to Record-Keeping Requirements for Certain Investment
Advisers Registered Under the Advisers Act, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 353,
1972 WL 128952 (Dec. 18, 1972).
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illuminating. It was concerned, the SEC said, that registered advisers would
be used as conduits for advice from entities that were not registered and
would remain beyond the scope of its jurisdiction.64 The same problem
presented itself in Richard Ellis's request for no-action relief, and the SEC
staff set out similar factors.65 The SEC staff said: One, the subsidiary should
be adequately capitalized. Two, it should have a buffer between its personnel
and the parent, such as a board of directors a majority of whose members
were independent of the parent. Three, employees who were engaged in
providing day-to-day advice should not be otherwise engaged in an
investment advisory business of the parent. Four, the subsidiary should
decide what investment advice is to be communicated to its clients and have
sources of information not limited to its parent. Five, the subsidiary should
keep its investment advice confidential until communicated to its clients.66
Reception of the Richard Ellis letter was mixed. On the one hand, foreign
advisers availed themselves of the opportunity to enter the U.S. market.
Within a few years, the SEC later noted, many foreign advisers had created
separate and independent registered subsidiaries or affiliates to service U.S.
clients, in reliance upon this no-action letter and the factors it had set out.6 7
Separately, in early 1988 the SEC Chairman indicated that the number of
foreign advisers registered with the SEC had reached more than 200.68
However, in practice, many observers believed the letter was not particularly
helpful.6 9 Thomas Harman ("Harman") joined the Division of Investment
Management in 1982, rose through the ranks to become Chief Counsel in
1988, and then became the Associate Director-Chief Counsel in 1992, a
position in which he continued to serve until he left the agency in 1994. He
recalls that under the Richard Ellis letter any sharing of employees between
the U.S. entity and the foreign enterprise subjected the entire enterprise to
registration under the Advisers Act.70 All institutions, he noted, roll up to
some small number of executives, so it was difficult to avoid subjecting the
entire enterprise to U.S. jurisdiction.7 ' Nor could the different entities share
64. Id.
65. See Ellis Letter, supra note 15, at 2.
66. Id.
67. Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation of Investment Companies,
55 Fed. Reg. 25,322, 25,325 (proposed June 21, 1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
270).
68. See Ruder Address, supra note 56.
69. See Telephone Interview with Thomas Harman (Apr. 28, 2017) [hereinafter
Harman Interview].
70. Id.
71. Id.
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affiliates.7 2 Finally, the staff would not say much about how the letter
applied in different factual circumstances.7 3 People in the regulated
community, Harman recalls, were frustrated because the factors were
difficult to apply and the staff did not provide a lot of guidance for particular
fact patterns.74 Further, from an international perspective, the Richard Ellis
letter had staked out a lot of territory. 5 Michael Mann ("Mann") was an
Associate Director in the SEC's Division of Enforcement in the 1980s, where
he led the division's international efforts, until in 1989 became the first
Director of the SEC's Office of International Affairs ("OIA"), in which
position he served until he left the agency in 1996. By reaching into foreign
jurisdictions, Mann said, the SEC was "trying to protect people who [had
not] signed up for our protection." 76 The Richard Ellis letter, he says, "drove
everyone crazy."77
In the years after issuance of the Richard Ellis letter, the pace of
internationalization began to accelerate. Through technological and
telecommunications developments, a regulatory environment predicated on
the use of the mails was being transformed. By the mid-1980s, the pressures
of internationalization were becoming apparent. In 1986, an SEC
Commissioner gave a speech in which she said: "[a] few years ago we used
to speak of capital markets as becoming international. Globalization was
denominated 'a trend.' Currently available information shows that tomorrow
has become today. The markets are internationalized and are becoming
increasingly global."7 1
Not surprisingly, given the increasing internationalization of the markets,
the SEC announced it was giving new attention to international issues. Its
efforts included working with the International Organization of Securities
Commissions ("IOSCO"), then a thirty-nation association of securities
regulators, to form multinational committees on a variety of issues, including
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Interview with Michael Mann (Apr. 13, 2017) [hereinafter April 13 Mann
Interview].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Aulana L. Peters, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks to North American Securities
Administrators Association, Inc. at the 69th Annual Conference in Honolul, Hawaii:
Internationalization: A Prediction Has Become Reality (Nov. 17, 1986), www.sec.gov/
news/speech/1986/111786peters.pdf The Commissioner went on to identify the twenty-
four-hour global trading market in securities, multi-national linkages among exchanges,
and the regulatory issues these developments raised. Id.
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international transactions and access to foreign markets. 79 In addition to the
IOSCO initiatives, internationalization was producing three specific forms
of pressure on the SEC, all of which would play a role in the agency's actions
regarding foreign-domiciled advisers. One, internationalization was
challenging the SEC's ability to police the securities markets in the U.S.
Two, foreign de-regulatory initiatives were challenging the SEC's regulatory
regime. Three, increasing numbers of foreign advisory businesses wished to
enter the U.S. market.
The first pressure felt by the SEC was its growing need for foreign
cooperation in its enforcement activities.so In the 1980s, the SEC recognized
that "cooperation from abroad" was an increasingly important element in its
enforcement activities." In many cases, SEC officials noted, information
was needed from foreign jurisdictions to police the U.S. markets.8 2 in a
speech given in London, in late 1986, the Director of the Division of
Enforcement noted that after an unsuccessful effort to assert direct
jurisdiction over foreign sources of information, the agency had instead
pursued the negotiation of bilateral information sharing agreements.83 These
agreements, known as Memoranda of Understanding, or "MOUs," were
negotiated with other financial regulators.84 They were not treaties, and
merely stated the parties' intent to cooperate, including, in some cases, intent
to seek authority for cooperation that was currently beyond the signatory's
authority." The first breakthrough MOU was between the SEC and Swiss
regulators.8 6 In 1986 the Director of Enforcement said: "mutual assistance
is becoming the norm rather than the exception."8 7
In 1988, this program was codified in an Act of Congress. When members
of Congress expressed concern that foreign regulators were not helping the
SEC fight frauds launched at the U.S. from abroad, the SEC staff
recommended that the SEC be given authority to reciprocate such
79. Fifty-Second Annual Report, SEC 3 (1986), https://www.sec.gov/about/annual
report/1986.pdf Today, IOSCO has more than 120 Ordinary Members, as well as
multiple Associated and Affiliated Members.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 15-16.
82. Gary Lynch, Dir., SEC Div. of Enforcement, Address to the Financial Times
International Conference: Developing the Global Market for Equities 9-10 (Oct. 21,
1986), www.sec.gov/news/speech/1986/102186lynch.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Interview by Wayne Carroll with Michael Mann, SEC Historical Soc'y (June 13,
2005) [hereinafter June 13 Mann Interview].
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Lynch, supra note 82, at 13.
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assistance." Congress responded by amending the Securities and Exchange
Act to authorize the SEC, in its discretion, to assist foreign regulators, even
when the conduct under investigation did not violate U.S. law.89 The SEC
then entered into agreements with the Departments of Justice and State
regarding how it would use this new power.90
This trend toward cooperation was institutionalized within the SEC in
1989, when OIA was created as a stand-alone office to focus on international
issues. 9' OIA was given primary responsibility for negotiating international
information sharing agreements and developing initiatives to facilitate
international cooperation. 92 It was a small office, initially having only two
attorneys and two support staff.93 Nonetheless, OIA created an institutional
presence within the agency focusing on international cooperation. Mann
recalls: "[w]e needed incentives for cooperation." 9 4 Creating regulatory
incentives for foreign regulators to cooperate with the SEC, Mann said,
would work to both parties' advantage.95
The second pressure felt by the SEC was from the growing appeal of
foreign de-regulation. U.S. regulators felt they were being pressured to de-
regulate a market that was, in their view, already well functioning.96
London's 1986 de-regulatory Big Bang drew attention around the world,
including at the SEC.97 Those favoring less regulated foreign regimes began
to challenge U.S. regulators, sometimes directly. For example, in a 1986
meeting in the Netherlands, SEC Commissioner Aulana Peters was called
88. April 13 Mann Interview, supra note 75. Mann recalls in particular the concerns
raised by Representatives Dingell of Michigan and Markey of Massachusetts.
89. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, §6(b), 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (enacting the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§78u(a)(2)).
90. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Comm'r, SEC, Address at King's College:
International Cooperation in Securities Enforcement: A New United States Initiative
(Nov. 9, 1988), www.sec.gov/news/speech/1988/110988grundfest.pdf
91. 1990 Annual Report, SEC (1990), https://www.sec.gov/about/annualreport/19
90.pdf
92. Id.
93. Interview by Wayne Carroll with Robert Strahota, SEC Historical Soc'y (Apr.
18, 2006).
94. April 13 Mann Interview, supra note 75.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. In the Big Bang, the United Kingdom deregulated its securities markets. It
was nicknamed "Big Bang" because many of the changes took place on a single day,
October 27, 1986. For a discussion of the changes from the perspective of a respected
American academician, see Norman S. Poser, Big Bang and the Financial Services Act
Seen Through American Eyes, 14 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 317 n.1, 319 (1988).
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upon to give a point-by-point response to foreign claims that U.S. finance
was over-regulated and that U.S. standards, such as corporate disclosure,
should be lowered. 98
Moreover, in 1986, those favoring international deregulation were given a
means to realize their goals. The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations
opened in 1986 and included bargaining over trade in services. 99 Even
though financial services were included in the talks, which implicated the
SEC's jurisdiction, no one had asked the SEC to participate.' 00 Indeed, when
representatives of the SEC sought a seat at the table, the Treasury
Department told them no.' 0 ' There was a lot of concern at the SEC about the
possible breadth of an agreement and its impact on the SEC's regulations. 02
Mann recalls that the SEC did not want securities regulations used as
bargaining chips in the negotiations.103 Indeed, Mann recalls: "[e]normous
pressures were building for rethinking the whole exercise of jurisdiction
from a more business-friendly point of view."1 04
The third pressure felt by the SEC was from foreign advisory businesses
that wished to enter the U.S. market. As one senior U.S. regulator recalls:
the SEC had foreign advisers "at our doors" who wanted to do business in
the U.S.' The SEC had to decide what to do about them, she said: "business
pressures were pushing us."1 06 This can be seen in an episode from the mid-
1980s. Stanley B. Judd was the SEC attorney who had signed the 1981
Richard Ellis letter. 0 7 In 1986 he published an article about "international
investment advisers."'0 o These advisers, he said, could be residents in one
country and giving advice in another, or nationals of one country and
98. See Aulana L. Peters, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks to Representative of the Dutch
Financial Community: "Peters vs. Peters" Internationalization: Are the Regulators
Ready? (Oct. 15, 1986), www.sec.gov/news/speech/1986/101586peters.pdf Comm-
issioner Peters was responding to Jaap F.M. Peters, President of AEGON, a Dutch
company.
99. See ERNEST H. PREEG, TRADERS IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD: THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADING SYSTEM 26-45 (1995).
100. June 13 Mann Interview, supra note 84.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. April 13 Mann Interview, supra note 75.
104. Id.
105. Telephone Interview with Marianne Smythe (Mar. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Smythe
Interview].
106. Id.
107. See Ellis Letter, supra note 15.
108. Stanley B. Judd, International Investment Advisers, 19 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG.
1(1986).
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offering advice from offices located in another.' 0 9 Contemporary members
of the staff in the Division of Investment Management recall that Judd's
article had a strong impact on their thinking."`0 Indeed, in at least one case,
Judd's article was cited by the staff as authority."' International advisers
posed problems under the Advisers Act, Judd said, including how to resolve
them being subject to both SEC and foreign regulation.11 2 Perhaps most
importantly, for purposes of this study, Judd questioned whether the SEC
intended to apply the securities laws to actions arising exclusively outside of
U.S. jurisdiction, including to the "wholly foreign activities of a registered,
non-resident adviser. "113
The growing tension between internationalization and the SEC's
regulatory policy toward advisers came to a head in 1986. The law firm,
Reavis & McGrath, requested a no-action letter on behalf of several
investment advisers that were domiciled within the U.S. and registered with
the SEC.11 4 The advisers managed offshore funds domiciled in the Cayman
Islands and Netherlands Antilles, and investors in the funds were primarily
from Western Europe, including France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland,
the Netherlands, and Italy. Reavis & McGrath presented a memorandum to
the SEC staff, which was treated as a no-action request, arguing that the
SEC's jurisdiction should not extend to foreign investors in the offshore
funds. Specifically, it argued, a provision of the Advisers Act, and SEC rule
thereunder, limiting an adviser's ability to charge performance fees-that is,
share in its clients' profits-should not apply to foreign clients."
In essence, the rule governing performance fees provided that an adviser
could not charge such fees unless certain conditions were met, generally
going to the clients' resources and invested assets.11 6 In its memorandum,
Reavis & McGrath conceded that the advisers would comply with the rule in
109. Id.
110. Author's Telephone Interview of Robert Plaze (conducted by telephone on May
19, 2017) [hereinafter Plaze Interview].
111. See, e.g., Gim-Seong Seow, SEC No-Action Letter, Response of the Office of
Chief Counsel, Division of Investment Management, 1987 WL 755518 (Oct. 30, 1987).
112. Judd, supra note 108, at 1-2.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Memorandum from Reavis & McGrath to Thomas P. Lemke, Chief Counsel,
Div. of Inv. Mgmt. and John Banks-Brooks, Attorney, Office of Disclosure Review, Div.
of Inv. Mgmt. (Aug. 14, 1986) [hereinafter Reavis & McGrath Memo.] (seeking
clarification about investment advisers acting under the authority of various foreign
jurisdictions).
115. Id.
116. See § 275.205-3 Exemption from the Compensation Prohibition of Section
205(a)(1) for Investment Advisers, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2018).
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regards to the small number of U.S. clients who invested in the funds." 7
However, in arguing against the rule's applicability to foreign clients, the
law firm made three points."' First, the securities laws do not favor
transnational application." 9 The law firm pointed to several statutory
provisions and rules (none from the Advisers Act) that explicitly provided
that they did not apply to foreign activity.1 2 0  Second, even if the SEC
believed it should retain jurisdiction over fraudulent behavior, other
provisions need not apply.121 Fraud, the law firm argued, was wrong
wherever it occurred, while the substantive (or non-fraud) provisions were
conditioned by the regulatory regime in which they took place.1 2 2 Third, the
law firm argued: "[t]he staff's concurrence in the position expressed in this
Memorandum would be conducive to sound foreign policy because that
position would reconcile the divergent interests of the various jurisdictions
involved."1 23  Specifically, the law firm argued, the nations in which the
foreign funds maintained their places of business (Cayman Islands and
Netherlands Antilles), and the nations of the non-U.S. investors (France,
United Kingdom, Switzerland, Netherlands and Italy) would be able to assert
their own jurisdiction, without being preempted by the United States and the
SEC's rule.
The SEC staff rejected these arguments.1 24 in response to the argument
that the securities laws disfavored a transnational reach, the staff indicated
that the absence of comparable limitations with respect to the Advisers Act
could argue against the law firm's position. Further, the staff stated, as a
general proposition it did not concur with the position that the rule at issue,
or other substantive provisions of the Act and rules, were designed solely for
U.S. clients. In general, the staff said, the provisions of the Advisers Act
applied to an adviser's "non-U.S. clients, as well as U.S. clients."1 25 Finally,
while no specific mention was made in the staff's response to the law firm's
argument based on foreign policy, the staff denied Reavis & McGrath's
request for no-action relief. This letter was probably clearest expression of
the policy underlying the Richard Ellis no-action letter. The staff explicitly
recognized the transnational consequences of their policy, rejected the
117. Reavis & McGrath Memo., supra note 114.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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suggestion that their focus should be on U.S. clients, and ignored arguments
arising from international relations. In the late 1980s, the pressures building
against this policy became increasingly powerful.
III. THE RED BOOK STUDY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE
UNIBANCO LETTER
The Advisers Act, along with the Investment Company Act, had been
enacted in 1940. Thus, as the 1980s drew to a close, their 50th Anniversary
was looming. David Ruder, SEC Chairman from 1987 to 1989, believed
some recognition of the anniversary date would be appropriate.1 2 6 An
industry group, the Investment Company Institute ("ICI"), was of the same
view.1 27 As a result, work began on an anniversary study.1 28 In 1990,
Marianne Smythe ("Smythe") was Executive Assistant to the SEC's
Chairman (a position now known as Chief of Staff), and from November
1990, Director of the Division of Investment Management, a position in
which she continued to serve until she left the agency in 1993. She recalls
that the creation of the anniversary study was largely fortuitous, when
viewed in relation to the issues at stake in the foreign reach of the Advisers
Act.1 2 9 The initial goal was simply to recognize the Act's anniversary,
perhaps with the idea of issuing a report on the anniversary itself, that is, in
1990.130
In March 1990, the Division of Investment Management established a
Task Force to conduct the study.' 3 ' The SEC reported that the Task Force
would reexamine the agency's regulatory approach on a variety of issues.13 2
In the Chairman's Office, Smythe was busy with a number of issues and had
only slight contact with the study's early development.1" Nonetheless, she
recalls that the selection of topics for the study took account of the small size
of the Division of Investment Management. 14 Given its constraints, Smythe
said, it made sense to focus on practical issues that could lead to specific
agency actions. In her words, that is how the foreign reach of the Advisers
Act "made the cut."1 35
126. Smythe Interview, supra note 105.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. 1990 Annual Report, supra note 91, at 48.
132. Id.
133. Smythe Interview, supra note 105.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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In June 1990, the Commission issued a Concept Release, setting out the
ideas the Task Force was considering.' 36 The Concept Release was a formal
statement of the Commission that asked for public comments. 137 In the
course of its discussion the Commission identified two motivating factors
for reforming the foreign reach of the Advisers Act.
The first factor sounded in economic efficiency and client service. The
need to establish a separate and independent subsidiary to enter the U.S.
market, the SEC said, could divide scarce personnel within an advisory firm
and reduce the capital resources available to both the parent and subsidiary,
thus diminishing the services provided to both foreign and U.S. advisory
clients.'38 in raising these concerns, the Concept Release cited to the staff
position taken in the Richard Ellis letter. 3 9 The question for the Task Force,
Smythe recalls, was how to allow foreign advisers to have a business
presence in the U.S., and how to give U.S. regulators the ability to deal with
that presence. 140
The second factor set out in the Concept Release was a classic concern of
foreign relations: fear of retaliation. "[F]oreign governments [the
Commission said] may perceive application of the [U.S.] Advisers Act to
their investment advisers' activities with respect to non-United States clients
as contrary to principles of international comity and might react by
reciprocating the treatment."14' Thus, the SEC continued, U.S. investment
advisers might find their overseas operations subject to increased restrictions
and their U.S. operations subject to the laws and regulations of foreign
countries.1 42 Mann recalls that this concern was driven by events in the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which, as noted above, was ongoing
at the time and threatened to encompass SEC regulations in negotiations over
market access. 143 In June 1990, the risk of foreign intervention in the SEC's
regulatory regime was at its height.
The SEC's Concept Release was issued on June 15, and just a few days
before, from June 11 to 13, the Uruguay Round's Working Group on
Financial Services had held its first meeting. 144 At the meeting, "financial
136. Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation of Investment Companies,
55 Fed. Reg. 25,322 (proposed June 21, 1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 25,325.
139. Id.
140. Smythe Interview, supra note 105.
141. Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation of Investment Companies,
55 Fed. Reg. at 25,325.
142. Id.
143. April 13 Mann Interview, supra note 75.
144. Working Group on Financial Services Including Insurance, Note on the Meeting
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advising" was identified as among the "services that offered possibilities for
multilateral liberalization."1 4 5 Moreover, market access was defined as
encompassing licensing and certification.1 4 6 For his part, the representative
of the U.S. indicated that reciprocity was a problem.1 47 A few weeks later
the U.S. representative would warn that "[r]eciprocity in the financial area
would guarantee chaos."1 48
At the June meeting, the Working Group's Chairman recognized that
domestic regulations may continue to have a role, through a prudential carve-
out from the trade agreements.1 4 9 However, the Chairman also recognized
several options for the carve-out, including that it could be narrow, broad, or
limited to certain approved examples of regulatory action.15 0  Given the
SEC's status and history as an independent regulatory agency, one can
understand why it would take a negative view of the possibility that trade
negotiations might limit it to certain multi-laterally-approved examples of
regulatory action.
In its Concept Release, the SEC asked for suggestions on how it could best
provide for cross-border and international sales of adviser services,
consistent with the protection of investors and its own enforcement
capability.' 5 ' Specific possible policy approaches identified by the SEC
included: amending or reinterpreting domestic law, entering into multi-
national or bilateral treaties, harmonizing conflicting regulation, or applying
concepts of comity and mutual recognition. 52 1in response to the Concept
Release, several comments were filed with the SEC, including eight
addressing the foreign reach of the Advisers Act.1 53
of 11-13 June 1990, WTO: GATT GROUP NEGOTIATIONS ON SERVICES (July 5, 1990)
[hereinafter Working Group June 1990], https://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SUL
PDF/92100236.pdf
145. Id. ¶ 20, at 5 (statement of the Representative from Canada).
146. Id. ¶ 22, at 5-6 (statement of the Representative from Japan).
147. Id. ¶¶ 59, 72, at 19 (statement of the Representative from the United States).
148. Working Group on Financial Services Including Insurance, Note on the Meeting
of l2-13 July 1990, WTO: GATT GROUP NEGOTIATIONS ON SERVICES ¶ 50, at 14 (Aug.
10, 1990) [hereinafter Working Group July 1990], https://www.wto.org/gattdoes/
English/SIJLPDF/92110082.pdf.
149. Working Group June 1990, supra note 144, ¶ 78, at 23 (statement of the
Chairman).
150. Id.
151. Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation of Investment Companies,
55 Fed. Reg. 25,322, 25,326 (proposed June 21, 1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
270).
152. Id.
153. See Protecting Investors: A Half Century of Investment Company Regulation,
SEC DIVISION INV. MGMT. 221 n.14 (May 1992) [hereinafter Protecting Investors
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The Division of Investment Management provided the Task Force with a
full-time staff of ten.1 54 Moreover, fifty other members of the Division staff
assisted the full-time staff.15 5 This was a substantial commitment in such a
small division. In the early 1990s the division operated with less than 160
staff years.1 56  The Office of Chief Counsel made an especially large
contribution to the study, and at the time it had a total of only five or six
attorneys. '5 7 As a result the study was a "huge drain" on its resources. 5 1
Attorneys in the Office were responsible for drafting several chapters and
Harman, the Chief Counsel, both drafted a chapter and consulted with those
drafting others, including the one relating to the foreign reach of the Advisers
Act.1 5 9 Harman also recalls that the staff assigned to the study were the "best
and the brightest," so the diversion of resources had a bigger impact than
numbers alone would suggest.1 6 0 Moreover, other policy issues continued to
press on the attention of the staff, and had to be addressed.161 Smythe recalls
that whatever the original intent for the schedule, when she became the
Division's Director in November 1990, the study was still underway.1 62 in
fact, the Task Force released its report in May 1992.
The Task Force entitled its report: Protecting Investors: A Half Century
of Investment Company Regulation ("Protecting Investors Report" or
"Report").1 63 While the Report generally focused on investment companies,
as shown by its title, Chapter 5 addressed the international reach of the
Advisers Act.1 6 4 The Task Force explained its recommendations in regards
Report], https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf The
author filed a Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") request with the SEC seeking access
to these eight comments and was told they could not be found.
154. See Letter from Marianne K. Smythe, Dir. SEC Div. Inv. Mgmt., to Richard C.
Breeden, Chairmen, SEC (May 1, 1992) [hereinafter Smythe Letter], https://www.sec.
gov/divisions/investment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf (published in Protecting Investors
Report, supra note 153).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., In Brief Budget Estimate Fiscal 1996, SEC 3 (Feb. 1995),
http://3197d6dl4b5fl9f2f440-5el3d29c4c016cf96cbbfdl97c579b45.r81.cfl.rackedn.c
om/collection/papers/1990/1995_0201_SECBudget.pdf (providing "Investment Man-
agement Regulation" figures for 1994 (actual) and 1995 (estimate) and noting that staff
years may differ from a head count of employees).
157. Harman Interview, supra note 69.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Smythe Interview, supra note 105.
163. Protecting Investors Report, supra note 153.
164. Id. at 221-36.
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to foreign-domiciled advisers as motivated by three considerations. 6 5 First,
the study said, foreign advisers may be reluctant to register with the SEC and
advise U.S. clients, because doing so subjects all of their clients to the U.S.
regulatory regime.' 66  The Report continued: this avoidance had the
unfortunate effect of limiting U.S. investors' access to foreign advisory
expertise.1 6 7 Second, the Report identified "general principles of comity,"
under which "nations recognize legislative and judicial acts of other nations,
having due regard for the rights of their own citizens."1 68  The Report
continued:
Comity suggests that the Advisers Act should not apply to a foreign
registered adviser's relationship with its non-United States clients outside
the United States, just as the Commission would not expect the laws and
regulations of a foreign country to apply to a United States adviser's
relationship with its United States clients. 169
The Report went on to note that the laws of other countries were consistent
with principles of comity, in terms of their extraterritorial reach or
enforcement, and cited to the regulatory regimes of the United Kingdom,
Brazil, Japan, and France.1o Third, the Report said, foreign clients of foreign
advisers do not expect "and may not desire" their adviser to be subject to the
Advisers Act.' 7  Assuming, the Report continued, "a foreign adviser does
not hold itself out as being registered under the Advisers Act, there would be
no apparent reason for a foreign investor to expect to be protected by United
States law."1 72
Based on this analysis-maximizing the availability of advice,
international comity, and the expectations of foreign investors-the Task
Force team concluded that the approach set out in the Richard Ellis no-action
letter should be changed. 173 Some new means of addressing the foreign reach
of the regulatory regime should be found. The Task Force team considered
several alternatives. 174 A "nationality" approach would have applied the
U.S. regulatory regime to U.S. citizens, "wherever they are located," and
regardless of where any conduct or the effects of any conduct might have
165. Id. at 228-30.
166. Id. at 231.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 229.
169. Id.
170. Id. at n.26.
171. Id. at 229.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 221.
174. Id. at 234-36.
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occurred. The Report stated that this approach was "generally disfavored,"
had not been extensively applied by the courts, and was not recommended. 7 5
A "local law for local clients" approach would have excused from the U.S.
regulatory regime any dealings between a U.S. adviser and clients residing
outside the U.S., even when the advice was formulated and provided by
persons residing in the U.S.1 76 This approach would have enhanced U.S.
advisers' ability to compete abroad by allowing them to meet more lenient
foreign standards, but the United States and the SEC, the Report stated:
"have a strong interest in preventing this country from being used as a base
for fraudulent or abusive practices by investment advisers."'7 7 This approach
was not recommended. An antifraud-only approach would have applied the
Act's anti-fraud provisions, "but not its regulatory provisions" to the
dealings of U.S. advisers and foreign clients.7 7 Here the Task Force team
observed that many of the regulatory requirements were intended as
prophylactic means to prevent fraud, and picking and choosing among them
would be a difficult and probably fruitless task.1 79 This approach was not
recommended. Finally, a "territorial" approach would focus on conduct and
the effects of conduct.'s The U.S. regulatory regime would apply when "a
sizeable amount of advisory services takes place in the United States[,] or
where the advisory services have effects in the United States."' This is the
approach that the Report recommended.
The cited legal standard-the conduct and effects test-had already been
the subject of extensive adjudication when the Protecting Investors Report
was issued. 8 2 Moreover, the standard has continued to draw attention,
including in recent litigation before the Supreme Court and in legislation by
Congress.'83 As discussed above, however, this article is less concerned with
the articulated legal standard, and more with the policy choices being made
by the agency. Those choices necessarily required the agency to consider
what it would, and would not seek to regulate. In this regard, the Report
said, when a foreign adviser registered with the SEC deals with U.S. clients,
175. Id. at 234.
176. Id. at 235.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 234-36.
179. Id. at 236.
180. Id. at 222.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 227 n.18. In addition, for a roughly contemporaneous discussion of the
test, see, e.g., Dennis R. Dumas, United States Antifraud Jurisdiction over Transnational
Securities Transactions: Merger of the Conduct and Effects Tests, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L
Bus. L. 721 (1995) (collecting cases).
183. See Laby, supra note 8, at 561-62.
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it can be assumed that advisory services will take place in the U.S., and the
Act will apply. 8 4 On the other hand, the Report continued, when the same
adviser deals with its foreign clients, advisory services will not take place in
the U.S. and the Act will not apply. 5 In other words, in a fundamental
policy shift, the SEC staff was willing to forgo regulation of a foreign-
domiciled adviser's dealings with foreign clients, even when that adviser was
registered with the SEC.
The Task Force described this new policy as one of comity with foreign
regulatory regimes.' 86 That is, as noted above, pursuant to a policy of
comity, SEC regulations should not apply to a foreign domiciled adviser's
relationship with its foreign clients, just as the SEC would not expect the
laws and regulations of a foreign jurisdiction to apply to a U.S domiciled
adviser's relationship with its U.S. clients." This was consistent with the
Commission's statement in the 1990 Concept Release that the study staff
would consider the concept of comity." However, several aspects of this
policy choice warrant further attention.
First, comity was not reciprocity. In its 1990 Concept Release, the
Commission appeared to link together the concepts of comity and mutual
recognition.19 However, the approach recommended by the Report was
inconsistent with reciprocity. Harman recalls meetings with British
regulators, in which they pressed the SEC representatives for a policy of
mutual reciprocity.' 90 The British, Harman recalls, took the view that each
regulator should oversee advisers in its own jurisdiction, and then share the
results with each other.' 9 ' Of course, this was inconsistent with the Report's
recommendation that the SEC should assert jurisdiction over foreign-
meaning here British-advisers' advice to clients in the U.S.1 9 2 In the event,
Harman recalls, whatever the recommendations in the Report, finite
regulatory budgets eventually made mutual reciprocity the practical or de
facto result.' 93
184. Protecting Investors Report, supra note 153, at 222.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 229.
187. Id.
188. Compare id. at 221-36, with Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation
of Investment Companies, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,322, 25,326 (proposed June 21, 1990) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 270).
189. Id. at 25,326.
190. Harman Interview, supra note 69.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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Second, while comity was not reciprocity, it relied to a considerable
degree on international regulatory cooperation. As Mann describes it, due
to international regulatory cooperation the whole concept of jurisdiction had
changed. 9 4 So long as the SEC could cooperate with a foreign entity's home
regulator, and obtain the information it needed, all the foreign entity had to
do was cooperate with the oversight. 9 5 To facilitate this type of oversight,
the Report recommended that foreign advisers registered with the SEC
should be required to keep certain records about their foreign operations, so
the SEC could monitor and enforce compliance issues implicating U.S.
clients. 9 6 For example, the Report suggested, trading records would show
if U.S. clients were being disadvantaged.19 7
Third, choosing comity as a policy required the SEC staff to forego certain
previously held views. Most important was its view of performance fees.
Through the years, performance fees had raised recurring issues regarding
the foreign reach of the Advisers Act. As discussed above, U.S. advisers'
ability to charge performance fees was subject to regulation, while in many
foreign jurisdictions such fees were an accepted practice.' 98 For example,
the offshore funds represented by Reavis & McGrath in 1986 had been
seeking a no-action letter primarily so they could charge performance fees.' 99
Their request was denied. 20 0 However, in Chapter 6 of the Report, the Task
Force adopted a new policy. 20' Robert Plaze ("Plaze") drafted the chapter
describing the new policy. Plaze joined the Division of Investment
Management in 1983, rose through the ranks to become Associate Director
for Regulation in February 1996, a position in which he continued to serve
until he was made Deputy Director of the Division in 2011, after which he
left the agency in 2012. In Plaze's words, as a matter of regulatory policy:
"What do we care if a Brit pays a performance fee?" 2 02 In light of this new
thinking, the Report recommended legislation that would authorize the SEC
to exempt from its performance fee requirements those clients of U.S.
advisers who do not reside in the U.S. 203 The Task Force reasoned that under
194. April 13 Mann Interview, supra note 75.
195. Id.
196. Protecting Investors Report, supra note 153, at 230.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 246-47.
199. See Reavis & McGrath Memo., supra note 114.
200. Id.
201. Protecting Investors Report, supra note 153, at 238 (recommending the concept
of performance fee exemptions).
202. Plaze Interview, supra note 110.
203. See Protecting Investors Report, supra note 153, at 246-48.
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the conduct and effects test recommended elsewhere in the Report, foreign
advisers would be permitted to charge such fees to their foreign clients, even
when registered with the SEC.2 04 Through the recommended legislation, U.S.
advisers would be permitted to do so as well, with regards to their foreign
clients.205
In short, by recommending a policy of comity the study team was
withdrawing from the agency's prior expansive reading of its jurisdiction.
One should also note, by selecting comity and not reciprocity, the SEC would
retain its freedom of unilateral action, since there would be no binding
bilateral commitments to reciprocate, only the general statements of intent to
cooperate set out in MOUs. Finally, by foregoing oversight of foreign
performance fees, the agency was conceding what had been, up to that point,
a significant point of frustration with its regulatory regime. All of these
measures would seem to be directed at one of the key concerns identified by
the agency in its Concept Release: the danger that an overreaching
regulatory posture could lead to foreign reciprocation. Yet, this leads to
something of a mystery in the historical narrative: the agency's earlier fear
of reciprocation seems to have disappeared.
The Report was silent on the threat of foreign reciprocation. Moreover,
neither Smythe nor Plaze recall that concern playing any role. 20 6 Harman,
for his part, recalls foreign concerns arising primarily in response to the
policy of comity. 20 7  Only Mann recalls the threat posed by potential
reciprocation.208 While puzzling at first glance, the inconsistency could be
explained by the officials' respective duties. Mann was, after all, Director
of the office charged with managing the agency's foreign relations.
Moreover, at a more substantive level, the threat posed by the Uruguay
Round appears to have passed rather quickly.
Shortly after the SEC released its Concept Release, the U.S. trade
delegation in the Uruguay Round circulated a communication to the Working
Group on Financial Services in which it argued that any agreement should
"respect the traditional duties, rights, and responsibilities of finance
ministers, central bank governors, and other regulators and officials in the
financial services sector." 2 09 The agreement must contain a provision, the
204. Id. at 247.
205. Id. at 247-48.
206. Smythe Interview, supra note 105; Plaze Interview, supra note 110.
207. Harman Interview, supra note 69.
208. June 13 Mann Interview, supra note 84.
209. Submission by the United States on Financial Services, WORKING GROUP ON FIN.
SERVICES (July 12, 1990), https://www.wto.org/gatt docs/English/SULPDF/92100258
.pdf.
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United States said, which permits a party: "[To take] reasonable actions
necessary for prudential reasons, for the protection of . . . persons to whom
a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service provider."2 10 As noted above,
one of the defining characteristics of an adviser under U.S. law is its status
as a fiduciary.21 ' Furthermore, while the SEC had been denied membership
on the trade delegation, it was able to insert representatives into the process,
who could monitor developments and advocate for a prudential carve-out
that would respect the agency's traditional powers.2 12 The Working Group
held further meetings in July and September 1990 and various drafts were
circulated of a prudential carve-out for domestic regulators. 213  Then, in
November 1990, the Chairman of the Working Group submitted his report
to the Brussels Ministerial Meeting, and it identified a carve-out for inclusion
in an annex or annotation that was largely consistent with the U.S.
position.2 14 In 1991, there would be further dickering over the carve-out, and
compromise language would be added to the effect that it could not be used
to avoid a member's obligations under the agreement.2 15 Nonetheless, the
submission of a favorable carve-out to the Ministerial level in November
1990 seems to be an important moment. Smythe became Director of the
Division of Investment Management in that month, and she does not recall
reciprocal or quid pro quo concerns having any impact on how the Report
was completed. 216 This suggests that the danger of reciprocation had largely
passed.
To implement its recommendations the Task Force recommended the use
of no-action letters.217 Smythe recalls that this approach was selected
210. Id.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 31-32; see also SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) (reinforcing the idea that "[t]he
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ... reflects a congressional recognition 'of the delicate
fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship').
212. June 13 Mann Interview, supra note 84.
213. See generally Working Group July 1990, supra note 148, at 1; Working Group
on Financial Services Including Insurance, Note on the Meeting of 13-15 September
1990, WTO: GATT GROUP NEGOTIATIONS ON SERVICES 1 (Oct. 16, 1990), https://docs.
wto.org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNSFIN/3.PDF.
214. Report by the Chairman of the Sectoral Ad Hoc Working Group to the GNS,
WTO: GATT GROUP NEGOTIATIONS ON SERVICES 1 (Nov. 6, 1990), https://docs.wto.
org/gattdocs/q/UR/GNS/W1 10.PDF.
215. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex on
Financial Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
216. Smythe Interview, supra note 105.
217. Protecting Investors Report, supra note 153, at 230-34 (suggesting several
possible approaches, including: the possibility of amending or reinterpreting domestic
law, entering into multi-national or bilateral treaties, or harmonizing conflicting
regulations); see Request for Comments on Reform of the Regulation of Investment
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because each foreign adviser's facts were sufficiently unique that the process
did not lend itself to a "cookie-cutter" rule-based approach.218 Plus she
recalls, the simple press of time and the need to wrap up the study and publish
the Report worked against an effort to formulate the new policy in the text
of a rule.219 Moreover, Mann recalls: "[w]e were incrementalists, and we
had a vision for it." 22 0  By being incrementalists, he added, the staff was
trying to learn. 22 ' They also avoided extraordinary risks by working on
incremental changes.222 Smythe agrees, stating that implementing the Task
Force's recommendations through no-action letters gave the staff "an
opportunity to make sure they did it right." 2 23
In the spring of 1992, the work of the Task Force was concluded. Smythe
recalls that the Report was released in May of 1992 for two reasons. 22 4 The
President, George H.W. Bush, launched an initiative in which federal
agencies were asked to review their regulations and consider how to
modernize them.225 Smythe met with the SEC's Chairman, Richard Breeden,
and they discussed the relationship of the Task Force to the President's
initiative. 2 26 The Chairman then asked Smythe to wrap up the work of the
Task Force so the Report could be released in a timely fashion. 2 27 Also,
given the interest of the ICI in the project, it was decided to schedule its
issuance to coincide with the ICI's annual membership meeting in May. 228
Smythe recalls that while the Report was not presented to the Commission
for a vote-it was a staff report-she and the members of the Task Force had
extensive meetings with the Commissioners and the Commissioners'
Counsels, to brief them on its conclusions.2 29 She recalls no controversy with
the Commissioners. 23 0 Following these consultations, Smythe signed the
Companies, 55 Fed. Reg. 25,322, 25,326 (proposed June 21, 1990) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 270).
218. Smythe Interview, supra note 105.
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225. See Memorandum from President George H.W. Bush on Implementing
Regulatory Reforms to Certain Department and Agency Heads (Apr. 29, 1992),
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Report's cover letter on May 1, 1992.231 The Report was then issued with a
red cover, giving it the common nickname: the "Red Book."
Ten days later, on May 11, 1992, the Division of Investment Management
received a request for a no-action letter to implement the Report.232 The
request was made by Uniao de Bancos de Brasileiros S.A., known as
Unibanco.233 At the time, Unibanco was the third largest non-governmental
bank in Brazil, and it provided a variety of financial services, including
investment management, commercial banking, and investment banking.23 4 It
also had a wholly owned subsidiary: Unibanco Consultoria de
Investimentos, S/C Ltda ("Consultoria"), which had registered with the SEC
as an investment adviser.235 Consultoria advised institutional investors in the
U.S., including an investment company, the Brazilian Investment Fund,
Inc.236 Unibanco asked, must it register with the SEC, and Consultoria
asked: may it provide advice to non-U.S. clients solely in accordance with
Brazilian law?
Smythe, as Division Director, was personally involved in identifying
Unibanco as the "right candidate" for implementing the new policy. 23 7
Indeed, Smythe recalls that Unibanco made its interest known while the Task
Force was still at work, and its situation had been considered as a test case
against which the recommendations in the Report were formulated. 238 The
Task Force wrote the language of the Report, she said, with the Unibanco
facts in front of them.239 As Smythe recalls: Unibanco was the patient "on
whom the various experimental procedures were being tried out." 24 0
Harman, as the Division's Chief Counsel led the effort to respond.24 ' Mann
on behalf of OIA also played an active role in working out the terms of the
staff's response.242 Unibanco received a speedy response.
On July 13, 1992, the Office of Chief Counsel issued a no-action letter
231. Smythe Letter, supra note 150.
232. Letter from Marcia L. MacHarg, Debevoise & Plimpton, to Thomas S. Harman,
Assoc. Dir. and Chief Counsel, Div. of Inv. Mgmt. (July 13, 1992), https://www.sec.go
v/divisions/investment/noaction/1 992/uniaodebancosO72892.pdf (citing the Firm's prior
letter, dated May 11, 1992, sent on behalf of Unibanco).
233. Unibanco Letter, supra note 5.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Harman Interview, supra note 69.
238. Smythe Interview, supra note 105.
239. Id.
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that showed the impact of the new policy.2 43 As the Report suggested, the
Division of Investment Management indicated that a "more flexible
interpretation" of the agency's jurisdictional reach was appropriate.2 44 In
place of the strict institutional segregation of parent and subsidiary set out in
the Richard Ellis letter, the SEC staff told Unibanco it need not register so
long as it met significantly less intrusive conditions.2 45 The separation of
parent and subsidiary would be recognized, the staff said, so long as the two
affiliated companies were separately organized (i.e., two legal entities); the
SEC-registered entity was staffed with personnel in the U.S. or abroad who
were capable of providing investment advice; all persons involved in U.S.
advisory activities would be supervised by the SEC-registered entity; and the
SEC would have sufficient access to the books and records of unregistered
affiliates involved in U.S. advisory activities to allow the SEC to monitor
and police conduct that might harm U.S. clients or markets. In the last
regard, Unibanco agreed to designate a U.S. agent for service of SEC
subpoenas and other process relating to any action arising out of
Consultoria's advisory services.2 4 6 It agreed to keep books and records in
English for Consultoria, consistent with the Adviser's Act requirements, and
separate from Unibanco's other books and records.24 7 It agreed to keep
certain records for Unibanco itself, generally relating to its financial status,
brokerage orders, discretionary authority, and client agreements. 248 Both its
own and Consultoria's books and records would be made available for
inspection by the SEC. 249 All Unibanco employees involved in Consultoria's
U.S. advisory activities, such as research analysts, would be produced to the
SEC for testimony.25 0 The SEC staff agreed that Unibanco need not
necessarily identify its customers, but Unibanco agreed it would not contest
the validity of an SEC subpoena, except under the laws of the United
States.25 '
Further, in place of the far-reaching assertion of jurisdiction over all
clients of registered firms that had been set out in previous no-action letters,
the SEC staff told Consultoria that it could provide advice to non-U.S. clients
solely in accordance with Brazilian (or other applicable) law, and without
243. See Unibanco Letter, supra note 5, at 3-5.
244. Id. at 3-4.
245. Id. at 5-7.
246. Id. at 5-6.
247. Id. at 6-7.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 7.
251. Id. at 5-7.
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necessarily complying with the Advisers Act.25 2  On the other hand,
Consultoria would keep records relating to all of its activities, including
those relating to foreign clients. 253 This would enable the SEC to monitor
and enforce the adviser's performance of its obligations to its U.S. clients
and the integrity of U.S. markets, including how Consultoria was treating its
U.S. clients in comparison to its foreign clients.254
The no-action letter to Unibanco and its subsidiary Consultoria shows the
immediate impact of the new policy. In a fitting indication of the seriousness
of the new policy, it was presented to the Commission for a vote. 255 Harman
recalls that it was rare to send a proposed no-action letter to the Commission
for a vote.256 In this case, however, a vote of the Commission was deemed
appropriate. Harman does not recall any negativity or controversy at the
Commission level. 2 57 The study, he recalls: "had paved the way." 258 Finally,
Harman signed the Unibanco letter himself, which was unusual. Typically,
more junior attorneys in the Office of Chief Counsel sign no-action letters.
Harman recalls that as he signed it, he was thinking: "[t]his is what the study
had intended." 259
IV. AFTER THE STUDY: 1993 To 2017
The Task Force had recognized that a policy of comity would involve fact-
specific determinations, and they began to arise almost immediately. Over
the next several years, the Office of Chief Counsel in the Division of
Investment Management issued a series of no-action letters addressing
questions arising under the new policy. For example, did the new policy
apply to the relationship between an SEC-registered adviser and an affiliate
under common control? The SEC staff answered yes, so long as the names
of participating affiliates were disclosed to U.S. clients and their activities
were supervised consistently with the Unibanco letter.260 Could an SEC-
registered firm obtain research reports from a foreign affiliate, without
252. Id. at 4-5.
253. Id. at 6-7.
254. Id. at 4-5.
255. Harman Interview, supra note 69. The author made a Freedom of Information
Act request to the SEC for a record of the vote the SEC responded that all records
regarding the vote were privileged.
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260. Mercury Asset Management. Plc, SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 136967 (Apr.
16, 1993), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/1993/mercuryassetO4169
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requiring the SEC-registered firm to supervise the research staff? The SEC
staff responded yes, so long as ethical barriers separated the advisory
personnel serving U.S clients from the researchers drafting the reports. 26 1
Could an SEC-registered firm and its foreign affiliates share office space,
records, telephone lines, other facilities, and personnel, including directors,
officers and employees? Again, the SEC staff answered yes.262 Would the
new policy apply to a foreign universal bank that could not provide the SEC
with the access required in other no-action letters, due to the law of the
bank's domicile preventing it from requiring employees to cooperate in a
foreign (i.e., SEC) regulatory inquiry? The SEC staff answered yes, so long
as the bank agreed to certain practical measures, such as making a good faith
effort to obtain employees' consent, providing records to the SEC with a
non-consenting employee's name redacted, and if necessary, helping the
SEC enlist the assistance of the bank's home nation regulators. 263 This last
condition is notable as one of the few places where the new role of
international regulatory cooperation slipped into the agency's public
deliberations regarding foreign-domiciled advisers. In the event,
implementing the new policy through no-action letters led to a large body of
fact-specific letters that advisers had to master in detail to understand the
agency's position.264 On the other hand, as a matter of regulatory policy, this
produced the type of incrementalist case-by-case decision-making
envisioned by the staff.265
In 1996, Congress consummated the SEC's change in policy. In the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 ("NSMIA"),
Congress amended the Advisers Act so the regulations governing
performance fees would no longer apply to an advisory client "who is not a
resident of the United States."266 Plaze played a key role in the legislative
process and recalls that it added "the final pieces" to the SEC's new policy. 267
With Congressional authorization regarding performance fees, the SEC
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could withdraw from this long-running source of international regulatory
conflict. The 1996 NSMIA legislation put this final piece in place. 2 68
In the years after the NSMIA legislation, the SEC has had several
opportunities to reiterate its adherence to the policy set out in the Protecting
Investors Report and implemented in the Unibanco letter. The most
important occasion arose in the aftermath of the Dodd-Frank Act, when the
SEC was called upon to extend registration and regulatory oversight to
several types of previously unregulated investment advisers. 2 69 in a formal
release voted upon and approved by the Commission, the SEC availed itself
of the opportunity to restate its: "long-held view that non-U.S. activities of
non-U.S. advisers are less likely to implicate U.S. regulatory interests and
that this territorial approach is in keeping with general principals of
international comity." 270 Indeed, the Commission made this point more than
once, 27 1 and in doing so, it cited to the Report.2 72 The cascading effects of
this policy on the specific registration and reporting requirements set out in
the Dodd-Frank Rules are beyond the scope of this Article, but one can see
that the SEC believed its actions were fundamentally consistent with the
policy it had chosen in the early 1990s.
Further, during the Dodd-Frank rulemaking the SEC stated that nothing it
said was intended to withdraw any prior statement of the Commission or the
views of the staff as expressed in the Unibanco letters.273 Moreover, the
continuing life of those letters was reiterated as recently as in March 2017
268. Id. Plaze also recalls that the SEC's new policy was reflected in Congress's
decision in the NSMIA legislation to assign regulatory responsibility for foreign-
domiciled advisers to the SEC, even when they failed to meet the standards that domestic
advisers were required to meet for federal registration (generally based on the amount of
assets they had under management). In Plaze's view this facilitated internationalization
by shielding foreign advisers from the burden of regulation by multiple states.
269. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. 111-203, § 408, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (repealing the private adviser exemption
that permitted unregistered advisers to manage private funds).
270. Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with
Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, 76
Fed. Reg. 39,646, 39,667 (July 6, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 275).
271. See 17 C.F.R. § 275 (2018).
272. See, e.g., id.
273. Id. at 39,681. While the SEC stated that it was not overruling the Unibanco
letters, it also stated that the Dodd-Frank Act had changed the regulatory context in which
those letters had been issued, most importantly, by repealing the exemption for private
advisers. Going forward, it said, it expected that the staff would "provide guidance, as
appropriate, based on facts that may be presented to the staff regarding the application
of the letters in the context" of the new Dodd-Frank provisions. While this may have
suggested some ambivalence about the on-going validity of the letters, later
developments, as set forth in the following text, seem to have laid such concerns to rest.
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when the SEC staff issued an Information Update for Advisers Relying on
the Unibanco No-Action Letters.274 The update recites the assurances
provided in the letters, states that multi-national financial firms rely upon
them, and then describes various documents that the firms may provide to
the SEC staff to demonstrate their compliance. 275 Twenty-five years after
issuance of the Unibanco letter, a formal process was established for relying
on its terms, and those of its progeny.
V. CONCLUSION
Reading the Unibanco letter today, twenty-five years after its issuance, it
is easy to view its spare language as a series of discrete requirements imposed
on a specific factual scenario. However, this falls well short of its full
importance. A long history of shifting policies lay behind the letter, and a
range of new policy considerations inspired its terms. This context must be
understood, if the letter and its policies are to be correctly applied in a
changing world.
In the history behind the Unibanco letter, one can see steadily building
pressures as the SEC staff's view of its jurisdiction came increasingly into
conflict with international developments. Initially, the SEC sought a
regulatory border that would encompass all actions by advisers that touched
the U.S. jurisdictional means, wherever the conduct took place. Further,
once an adviser entered the U.S., by registering with the SEC, the agency's
staff purported to regulate all the adviser's activities, wherever they took
place. Then, in the early 1980s, in a first response to internationalization,
the SEC staff issued the Richard Ellis letter, which had allowed a certain
degree of foreign affiliation. However, the conditions it imposed were
difficult to meet and provided little satisfaction. Finally, in the early 1990s,
pressured by the need for foreign enforcement cooperation, the threat posed
by multi-lateral trade negotiations, and businesses seeking to enter the U.S.
market, the SEC staff developed a new policy: comity with foreign
regulatory regimes. Through this new policy of comity, as implemented in
the Unibanco letter, foreign-domiciled advisers could register with the SEC,
provide services in the U.S., and be subject to SEC regulation within the
U.S., without subjecting all their foreign operations and clients to SEC
regulation. 27 6 Moreover, in the following twenty-five years, the SEC and its
staff have reiterated their attachment to this policy.
Of course, the durability of the policy implemented in the Unibanco letter
274. See generally Update for Advisers, supra note 11.
275. Id.
276. See Unibanco Letter, supra note 5.
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has provided ample opportunities for its interpretation. What was comity,
one could ask, beyond passive deference to foreign regulators? Stated
another way, were there positive values in the SEC's new policy that could
be used to understand and apply the letter and its progeny? Having reviewed
the process in which the SEC adopted this new policy, including the
pressures that were working on it and the policy vision that was adopted in
response, one can see that comity embodied several positive values. Three,
in particular, stand out.
First, the Unibanco letter reflected a new regulatory flexibility regarding
border-straddling firms. Indeed, where the Protecting Investors Report
spoke of 'comity,' the Unibanco letter spoke of 'flexibility.' 2 7 7 Because of
this flexibility, one could not say with precision where the regulatory border
fell, at least not-to use Smythe's words-in a cookie cutter rules-based
approach. Rather, it would depend on individual facts and circumstances.
Lawyers and regulators who prefer the precision of bright lines and clear
binary choices might find this flexibility uncomfortable. Nonetheless, it was
a serious policy. In the context of the time, Plaze notes, as foreign markets
were opening to U.S. interests, how could the SEC continue to follow
restrictive policies at home? 278
Second, the new policy of comity also addressed the concern raised in the
SEC's 1990 Concept Release that the agency's then-expansive assertion of
jurisdiction over foreign-domiciled advisers could lead to foreign
reciprocation. In 1990, the U.S. Representative to the Uruguay Round's
Working Group on Financial Services had also highlighted the danger of
reciprocity. It would, he said, "guarantee chaos." 2 79  The threat of
reciprocation, however, has not received the attention it deserves, probably
because it appears to have been at its height for only a few months. A few
days before the SEC issued its Concept Release, in June 1990, the session of
the Uruguay Round's Working Group on Finance which considered possible
multilateral intervention in the regulation of advisory services. Then, only
about five months later, in November, a proposed prudential carve-out
favorable to the SEC had reached the Brussels Ministerial Meeting. Perhaps
not surprisingly, given that the danger passed so quickly, several members
of the staff involved in the study, in the Unibanco letter, and in later
legislation do not recall this concern. Nonetheless, in Mann's view, in
responding to the challenge of internationalization, the greatest liberalization
may have taken place in regards to the foreign reach of the Advisers Act, but
277. See Unibanco Letter, supra note 5, at 4.
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279. Working Group July 1990, supra note 148, ¶ 50, at 14 (statement of the
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that was simply because the Richard Ellis no-action letter had previously
staked out such a large amount of territory.280 Further, while Smythe does
not recall the threat of reciprocation, she concurs that the Richard Ellis policy
had become anachronistic, because it "just didn't make any sense" that
foreign advisers had to obey U.S. law "in all the countries where they
operated." 281
Third, the new policy of comity reflected a positive vision for the future
of international regulatory cooperation. As Mann put it, in pursuing a policy
of voluntary MOUs, the SEC's goal was to find ways through problems and
develop a level of trust with foreign regulators.282 Further, he says, because
of the newly cooperative international regulatory environment established by
the MOUs, the nature ofjurisdiction could be reconsidered. 28 3 The SEC need
not assert its own jurisdiction over an adviser's foreign operations and
relationships when it could obtain whatever assistance it might need through
voluntary collaboration with a firm's foreign regulator (backed, one must
add, by the recordkeeping requirements in the Unibanco letters). This hope
for cooperation was nearly invisible in the SEC's policy-making process
regarding foreign-domiciled advisers. Yet, as Mann indicates, it was a
serious policy consideration. Moreover, as Harman noted, in the event, even
comity eventually gave way to something closer to defacto reciprocity. 28 4
In sum, to understand and apply the Unibanco letter and its progeny one
must read them as the result of a long policy process and as expressing a new
policy vision of comity that embodied several affirmative values: flexibility,
restraint, and international cooperation. It is beyond the scope of this article
to attempt to trace those values through the letter's progeny, or how they
might apply to the interpretative questions that could arise going forward.
Nonetheless, based on the letter's durability, one could conclude that the
policies had been well chosen. Perhaps, though, in a study based on
interviews, the final concluding word should be given to the SEC official
who signed the Unibanco letter. As Harman recalls, when the SEC
embarked on its new policy, it "did not give up much." 285
280. Plaze Interview, supra note 110.
281. Smythe Interview, supra note 105.
282. June 13 Mann Interview, supra note 84.
283. Id.
284. Harman Interview, supra note 69.
285. Id.

